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Abstract—Despite inherent ill-definition, anomaly detection is
a research endeavour of great interest within machine learning
and visual scene understanding alike. Most commonly, anomaly
detection is considered as the detection of outliers within a
given data distribution based on some measure of normality.
The most significant challenge in real-world anomaly detection
problems is that available data is highly imbalanced towards
normality (i.e. non-anomalous) and contains a most a sub-set
of all possible anomalous samples - hence limiting the use of
well-established supervised learning methods. By contrast, we
introduce an unsupervised anomaly detection model, trained
only on the normal (non-anomalous, plentiful) samples in order
to learn the normality distribution of the domain, and hence
detect abnormality based on deviation from this model. Our
proposed approach employs an encoder-decoder convolutional
neural network with skip connections to thoroughly capture the
multi-scale distribution of the normal data distribution in high-
dimensional image space. Furthermore, utilizing an adversarial
training scheme for this chosen architecture provides superior
reconstruction both within high-dimensional image space and a
lower-dimensional latent vector space encoding. Minimizing the
reconstruction error metric within both the image and hidden
vector spaces during training aids the model to learn the distri-
bution of normality as required. Higher reconstruction metrics
during subsequent test and deployment are thus indicative of a
deviation from this normal distribution, hence indicative of an
anomaly. Experimentation over established anomaly detection
benchmarks and challenging real-world datasets, within the
context of X-ray security screening, shows the unique promise of
such a proposed approach.
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection; Generative Adversar-
ial Networks; Skip Connections; X-ray Security Screening,
GANomaly
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is an increasingly important area within
visual image understanding. Following recent trends in the
field, there has been a significant increase in the availability
of large datasets. However, in most cases such data re-
sources are highly imbalanced towards examples of normality
(non-anomalous), whilst lacking in examples of abnormality
(anomalous) and offering only partial coverage of all possi-
bilities can could encompass this latter class. This variation,
and somewhat unknown nature, of the anomalous class mean
such datasets lack the capacity and diversity to train tradi-
tional supervised detection approaches. In many application
scenarios, such as the X-ray screening example illustrated in
Figure 1, the availability of anomalous cases may be limited
and may evolve over time due to external factors. Within
such scenarios, unsupervised anomaly detection has become
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Sub-sample of the X-ray screening application dataset used
to train the proposed approach: (a) training data contains normal
samples only, while the test data (b) comprises both normal and
abnormal samples.
instrumental in modeling such data distributions, whereby the
model is trained only on normal (non anomalous) samples to
capture the distribution of normality, and then evaluated on
both unseen normal and abnormal (anomalous) examples to
find their deviation from the distribution.
A significant body of prior work exists within anomaly
detection for visual scene understanding [1]–[5] with a wide
range of application domains [6]–[10]. A common hypoth-
esis in such anomaly detection approaches is that abnormal
samples differ from normality in not only high-dimensional
image space but also with lower-dimensional latent space
encoding. Hence, mapping high-dimensional images to lower-
dimensional latent space becomes essential. The critical issue
here is that capturing the distribution of the normal samples is
rather challenging. Recent developments in Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GAN) [11], shown to be highly capable of ob-
taining input data distribution, have led to a renewed interest in
the anomaly detection problem. Several contemporary studies
demonstrate that the use of GAN has great promise to address
this anomaly detection problem since they are inherently
adept at mapping high-dimensional to lower dimensional latent
encoding and vice-versa with minimal information loss [9],
[12], [13].
Schlegl et al. [9] trains a pre-trained GAN backwardly
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to map from image space to lower-dimensional latent space,
hypothesizing that differences in latent space would yield
anomalies. Zenati et al. [12] jointly train a two network to
capture normal distribution by mapping from image space
to latent space, and vice-versa. Akçay et al. [13] trains an
encoder-decoder-encoder network with the adversarial scheme
to capture the normal distribution within the image and latent
space. Sabokrou et al. [14] also trains an adversarial network
to capture the normal distribution, hypothesizing that the
model would fail to generate abnormal samples, where the
difference between the original and generated images would
yield the abnormality. This prior work in the field [9], [12]–
[14], empirically illustrates both the importance and promise
of anomaly detection anomalies within dual image and latent
space.
Here we propose a new method for anomaly detection via
the adversarial training over a skip-connected encoder-decoder
(convolutional neural) network architecture. Whilst adversarial
training has shown the promise of GAN in this domain [13],
skip-connections within such UNet style (encoder-decoder)
[15] generator networks are known to enable the multi-scale
capture of image space detail with sufficient capacity to gen-
erate high-quality normal image drawn from the distribution
the model has learned. Similar to [9], [12], [13], the proposed
approach also seeks to learn the normal distribution in both
the image and latent spaces via a GAN generator-discriminator
paradigm. The discriminator network not only forces the
generator to learn an improved model of the distribution but
also works as a feature extractor such that it learns the recon-
struction of the normal distribution within a lower-dimensional
latent space. Evaluation of the model on various established
benchmarks [16], [17] statistically illustrate superior anomaly
detection task performance over prior work [9], [12], [13].
Subsequently, the main contributions of this paper are as
follow:
• unsupervised anomaly detection — a unique unsu-
pervised adversarial training regime, over a skip-
connected encoder-decoder convolutional network archi-
tecture, yields superior reconstruction within the image
and latent vector spaces.
• efficacy — an efficient anomaly detection algorithm
achieving quantitatively and qualitatively superior perfor-
mance against prior state-of-the-art approaches.
• reproducibility — a simple yet effective algorithmic ap-
proach that can be readily reproduced.
II. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection is a major area of interest within the
field of machine learning with various real-world applications
spanning from biomedical [9] to video surveillance [10].
Recently, a considerable literature has grown up in the field,
leading to a proliferation of taxonomy papers [1]–[5]. Due to
the current trends, the review in the paper primarily focuses
on reconstruction-based anomaly detection approaches.
One of the most influential accounts of anomaly detection
using adversarial training comes from Schlegl et al. [9].
The authors hypothesize that the latent vector of the GAN
represents the distribution of the data. However, mapping to
the vector space of the GAN is not straightforward. To achieve
this, the authors first train a generator and discriminator using
only normal images. In the next stage, they utilize the pre-
trained generator and discriminator by freezing the weights
and remap to the latent vector by optimizing the GAN based on
the z vector. During inference, the model pinpoints an anomaly
by outputting a high anomaly score, reporting significant
improvement over the previous work. The main limitation of
this work is its computational complexity since the model
employs a two-stage approach, and remapping the latent vector
is extremely expensive. In a follow-up study, Zenati et al. [12]
investigate the use of BiGAN [18] in an anomaly detection
task, examining joint training to map from image space to la-
tent space simultaneously, and vice-versa. Training the model
via [9] yields superior results on the MNIST [19] dataset. In
a similar study in which image and latent vector spaces are
optimized for anomaly detection, Akçay et al. [13] propose an
adversarial network such that the generator comprises encoder-
decoder-encoder sub-networks. The objective of the model is
not only the minimize the distance between the real and fake
normal images, but also minimize the distance within their
latent vector representations jointly. The proposed approach
achieves state-of-the-art performance both statistically and
computationally.
Taken together, these studies support the notion that the use
of reconstruction-based approaches shows promise within the
field [9], [10], [12]–[14]. Motivated by the previous methods
in which latent vectors are optimized [9], [12], [13], we pro-
pose an anomaly detection approach that utilizes adversarial
autoencoders with skip connections. The proposed approach
learns representations within both image and latent vector
space jointly and achieves numerically superior performance.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
Before proceeding to explain our proposed approach, it is
important to introduce the fundamental concepts.
A. Background
1) Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN): GAN are un-
supervised deep neural architectures that learn to capture any
input data distribution by predicting features from an initially
hidden representation. Initially proposed in [11], the theory
behind GAN is based on a competition of two networks within
a zero-sum game framework, as initially used in game theory.
The task of the first network, called Generator (G) is to capture
the distribution of the input dataset for a given class label, by
predicting features (or images) from a hidden representation,
which is commonly a random noise vector. Hence the gener-
ator network has a decoder network architecture such that it
up-samples the input arbitrary latent representation to generate
high dimensional features. The task of the second network,
called Discriminator (D), on the other hand, is to predict the
correct class (i.e., real vs. fake) based on the given features
(or images). The discriminator network usually adopts encoder
network architecture such that for a given high dimensional
feature, it predicts its class label. With optimization based
on a zero-sum game framework, each network strengthens its
prediction capability until they reach an equilibrium.
Due to their inherent potential for capturing data distribu-
tions, there is a growing body of literature that recognizes
the importance of GAN [20]. Training two networks jointly
to reach an equilibrium, however, is not a straightforward
procedure, causing training instability issues. Recently, there
has been a surge of interest in addressing the instability issues
via several empirical methodologies [21], [22]. An innovative
and seminal work of Radford and Chintala [23] pioneered
a new approach to stabilize GAN training by using fully
convolutional layers and batch normalization [24] throughout
the network. Another well-known attempt to stabilize GAN
training is the use of Wasserstein loss in the training objective,
which significantly improves the training issues [25], [26].
2) Adversarial Auto-Encoders (AAE): Conceptually similar
to GAN, AAE consist of a generator and a discriminator
networks. The generator has a bow-tie architectural network
style comprising both an encoder and a decoder. The task of
the generator is to reconstruct an input data by down-sampling
it into a latent representation first, and then by upsampling the
latent vector into the reconstructed data (image). The task of
the discriminator network is to predict whether the input is a
latent vector from the auto-encoder or the prior distribution
initialized arbitrarily. Training AAE provides superior recon-
struction as well as the capability of controlling the latent
space [20], [27], [28].
3) Inference within GAN: A strong correlation has been
demonstrated between the manipulation of the input noise
vector and the output of the generator network [23], [29].
Similar latent space variables have demonstrably produced
visually similar high-dimensional images [30]. One approach
to finding the optimal latent vectors to create similar images
is to inversely map images back to their hidden space via
their gradients [31]. Alternatively, with an additional encoder
network that down-samples high dimensional images into
lower dimensional latent space, vanilla GAN are reported to
be capable of learning inverse mapping [18]. Another way
to learn inference via inverse mapping is to jointly train two
networks such that the former maps images to latent space,
while the latter maps this latent space representation back into
higher dimensional image space [32]. Based on these previous
findings, the primary aim of this paper is to explore inference
within GAN by exploiting the latent vector representation
in order to find unique a representation for a normal (non
anomalous) data distribution such that it can be statistically
differentiated from unseen, unknown and varying abnormal
(anomalous) data samples.
B. Proposed Approach
1) Problem Definition: This work proposes an unsuper-
vised approach for anomaly detection.
We adversarially train our proposed convolutional network
architecture in an unsupervised manner such that the concep-
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Fig. 2: Overview of the proposed adversarial training procedure.
tual model is trained on normal samples only, and yet tested
on both normal and abnormal ones. Mathematically, we define
and formulate our problem as the following:
An input dataset D is split into train Dtrn and test sets Dtst
such that Dtrn = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xm, ym)} contains
m normal samples, where yi = 0 denotes normal class. The
test set Dtst = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xm, ym)} comprises n
normal and abnormal samples, where yi ∈ [0, 1] for normal
and abnormal classes, respectively. In practical setting, m 
n.
Based on the dataset defined above, we are to train our
model f on Dtrn and evaluate its performance on Dtst.
The training objective (J ) of the model f is to capture the
distribution of Dtrn within not only image space but also
hidden latent vector space. Capturing the distribution within
both dimensions by minimizing J enable the network to learn
higher and lower level features that are unique to normal
images. We hypothesize that defining an anomaly score A(.)
based on the training objective J would yield minimum
anomaly scores for training samples —normal samples, but
higher scores for abnormal images. Hence a higher anomaly
score A(x) for a given sample x would indicate whether x is
any abnormal with respect to the distribution of normal data
learned by f from Dtrn during training.
2) Pipeline: Figure 2 shows a high-level overview of the
proposed approach, which comprises a generator (G) and
a discriminator (D) networks, respectively. The network G
adopts a bow-tie network using an encoder (GE) and a
decoder (GD) networks. The encoder network captures the
distribution of the input data by mapping high-dimensional
image (x) into lower-dimensional latent representation (z) such
that GE : x → z, where x ∈ Rw×h×c and z ∈ Rd. As
illustrated in Figure 3, the network GE reads input x through
five blocks containing Convolutional and BatchNorm layers
as well as LeakyReLU activation function and outputs the
latent representation z, which is also known as the bottleneck
features that carries a unique representation of the input.
Being symmetrical to GE , the decoder network GD up-
samples the latent vector z back to the input image dimension
and reconstructs the output, denoted as xˆ. Motivated by
[15], the decoder GD adopts skip-connection approach such
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Fig. 3: Details of the proposed network architecture.
that each down-sampling layer in the encoder network is
concatenated to its corresponding up-sampling decoder layer
(Figure 3). This use of skip connections provides substantial
advantages via direct information transfer between the layers,
preserving both local and global (multi-scale) information, and
hence yielding better reconstruction.
The second network within the pipeline, shown in Figure
3 (b), called discriminator (D), predicts the class label of
the given input. In this context, its task is to classify real
images (x) from the fake ones (xˆ), generated by the network
G. The network architecture of the discriminator D follows the
same structure as the discriminator of the DCGAN approach
presented in [23]. Besides being a classifier, the network D is
also used as a feature extractor such that latent representations
of the input image x and the reconstructed image xˆ are
computed. Extracting the features from the discriminator to
perform inference within the latent space is the novel part of
the proposed approach compared to the previous approaches
[9], [12], [13].
Based on this multi-network architecture, explained above
and shown in Figure 3, the next section describes the proposed
training objective and inference scheme.
C. Training Objective
As explained in Section III-B1, the idea proposed in this
work is to train the model only on normal samples, and test
on both normal and abnormal ones. The motivation is that
we expect the model to be able to correctly reconstruct the
normal samples either in image or latent vector space. The
hypothesis is that the network is conversely expected to fail to
reconstruct the abnormal samples as it is never trained on such
abnormal examples. Hence, for abnormal samples, one would
expect a higher loss for the reconstruction of the output image
representation xˆ or the latent representation zˆ. To validate
this, we propose to combine three loss values (Adversarial,
Contextual, Latent), each of which has its own contribution to
make within the overall training objective.
1) Adversarial Loss: In order to maximize the reconstruc-
tion capability for the normal images x during training, we
utilize the adversarial loss proposed in [11]. This loss, shown
in Equation 1, ensures that the network G reconstructs a
normal image x to xˆ as realistically as possible, while the
discriminator network D classifies the real and the (fake)
generated samples. The task here is to minimize this objective
for G, and maximize for D to achieve min
G
max
D
Ladv , where
Ladv is denoted as
Ladv = E
x∼px
[logD(x)] + E
x∼px
[log(1−D(xˆ)]. (1)
2) Contextual Loss: The adversarial loss defined in Section
III-C1 impose the model to generate realistic samples, but
does not guarantee to learn contextual information regarding
the input. To explicitly learn this contextual information to
sufficiently capture the input data distribution for the normal
samples, we apply L1 normalization to the input x and the
reconstructed output xˆ. This normalization ensures that the
model is capable of generating contextually similar images to
normal samples. The contextual loss of the training objective
is shown below:
Lcon = E
x∼px
|x− xˆ|1. (2)
3) Latent Loss: With the adversarial and contextual losses
defined above, the model is able to generate realistic and
contextually similar images. In addition to these objectives, we
aim to reconstruct latent representations for the input x and
the generated normal samples xˆ as similar as possible. This
is to ensure that the network is capable of producing contex-
tually sound latent representations for common examples. As
depicted in Figure 3(b), we use the final convolutional layer
of the discriminator D, and extract the features of x and xˆ to
reconstruct their latent representations such that z = f(x) and
zˆ = f(xˆ). The latent representation loss therefore becomes:
Llat = E
x∼px
|f(x)− f(xˆ)|2. (3)
Finally, total training objective becomes a weighted sum of
the losses above.
L = λadvLadv + λconLcon + λlatLlat (4)
where λadv , λcon and λlat are the weighting parameters
adjusting the dominance of the individual losses to the overall
objective function.
D. Inference
To find the anomalies during the testing and subsequent
deployment, we adopt the anomaly score, proposed in [9] and
also employed in [12]. For a given test image x˙, its anomaly
score becomes:
A(x˙) = λR(x˙) + (1− λ)L(x˙) (5)
where R(x˙) is the reconstruction score measuring the con-
textual similarity between the input and the generated images
based on Equation 2. L(x˙) denotes the latent representation
score measuring the difference between the input and gener-
ated images based on Equation 3. λ is the weighting parameter
controlling the relative importance of the score functions.
Based on Equation 5, we then compute the anomaly scores
for each individual test sample x˙ in the test set Dtst, and
denote as anomaly score vector A such that A = {Ai :
A(x˙i), x˙i ∈ Dtst}. Finally, following the same procedure
proposed in [13], we also apply feature scaling to A to scale
the anomaly scores within the probabilistic range of [0, 1].
Hence, the updated anomaly score for an individual test sample
x˙ becomes:
Aˆ(x˙) = A(x˙)−min(A)
max(A)−min(A) . (6)
Equation 6 finally yields an anomaly score vector Aˆ for
the final evaluation of the test set Dtst, which is explained in
Sections IV-C and V.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section introduces the datasets, training and implemen-
tational details as well as the evaluation criteria used within
the experimentation.
A. Datasets
To demonstrate the proof of concept of the proposed ap-
proach, we validate the model on four different datasets, each
of which is explained in the following subsections.
We perform our evaluation using the benchmark CIFAR-10
dataset [16] and also the UBA and FFOB datasets [13]. Using
CIFAR-10 we formulate a leave one class out anomaly de-
tection problem. For the application context of X-ray baggage
screening [33], the UBA and FFOB datasets from [13] are
used to formulate an anomaly detection problem based on the
concept of weapon threat items being an anomaly within the
security screening process.
1) CIFAR-10: Experiments for the CIFAR-10 dataset has
the one versus the rest approach. Following this procedure
yields ten different anomaly cases for CIFAR-10, each of
which has 45, 000 normal training samples, and 9, 000:6, 000
normal-abnormal test samples.
2) University Baggage Dataset —UBA: This in-house
dataset comprises 230,275 dual energy X-ray security image
patches extracted via a 64 × 64 overlapping sliding window
approach. The dataset contains 3 abnormal sub-classes —knife
(63,496), gun (45,855) and gun component (13,452). Normal
class comprises 107,472 benign X-ray patches, splitted via
80:20 train-test ratio.
3) Full Firearm vs Operational Benign —FFOB: As pre-
sented in [13], we also evaluate the performance of the model
on the UK government evaluation dataset [17], comprising
both expertly concealed firearm (threat) items and operational
benign (non-threat) imagery from commercial X-ray security
screening operations (baggage/parcels). Denoted as FFOB,
this dataset comprises 4,680 firearm full-weapons as full
abnormal and 67,672 operational benign as full normal images,
respectively.
B. Training Details
The training objective L from Equation 4 is optimized via
Adam [34] optimizer with an initial learning rate lr = 2e−3
with a lambda decay, and momentums β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999.
The weighting parameters of L is chosen as λadv = 1,
λrec = 40 and λlat = 1, empirically shown to yield the
optimal performance (See Figure 9). The model is initially set
to be trained for 15 epochs; however, in most cases it learns
sufficient information within less training cycles. Therefore,
we save the parameters of the network when the performance
of the model starts to decrease since this reduce is a strong
indication of over-fitting. The model is implemented using
PyTorch [35] (v0.5.1, Python 3.7.1, CUDA 9.3 and CUDNN
7.1). Experiments are performed using an NVIDIA Titan X
GPU.
C. Evaluation
The performance of the model is evaluated by the area
under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristics
(ROC) [36], a function plotted by the true positive rates (TPR)
and false positive rates (FPR) with varying threshold values
(as per prior work in the field [9], [12], [13]
CIFAR-10
Model bird car cat deer dog frog horse plane ship truck
AnoGAN [9] 0.411 0.492 0.399 0.335 0.393 0.321 0.399 0.516 0.567 0.511
EGBAD [12] 0.383 0.514 0.448 0.374 0.481 0.353 0.526 0.577 0.413 0.555
GANomaly [13] 0.510 0.631 0.587 0.593 0.628 0.683 0.605 0.633 0.616 0.617
Proposed 0.448 0.953 0.607 0.602 0.615 0.931 0.788 0.797 0.659 0.907
TABLE I: AUC results for CIFAR-10 dataset
bird car cat deer dog frog horse plane ship truck
0.2
0.4
0.6
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AnoGANEGBADGanomalyProposed
Fig. 4: AUC results for CIFAR-10 dataset. Shaded areas in the plot
represents variations due to the use of 3 random seeds.
V. RESULTS
For the CIFAR-10 dataset, Table I / Figure 4 demonstrate
with the exception of abnormal classes bird and dog, the
proposed model yield superior results to the prior work.
Table II presents the experimental results for UBA and
FFOB datasets. It is apparent from this table that the pro-
posed method significantly outperforms the prior work in each
anomaly cases of the datasets. Of significance, the best AUC
of the prior work is 0.599 for the most challenging abnormality
case – knife, while the method proposed here achieves AUC
of 0.904.
UBA FFOB
Method gun gun-parts knife overall full-weapon
AnoGAN [9] 0.598 0.511 0.599 0.569 0.703
EGBAD [12] 0.614 0.591 0.587 0.597 0.712
GANomaly [13] 0.747 0.662 0.520 0.643 0.882
Proposed 0.972 0.945 0.904 0.940 0.903
TABLE II: AUC results for UBA and FFOB datasets
Figure 7 depicts exemplar test images for the datasets used
in the experimentation. A significant result emerging from
the examples presented within Figure 7 is that the proposed
model is capable of generating both normal and abnormal
reconstructed outputs at test time, meaning that it captures
the distribution of both domains. This is probably due to the
use of skip connections enabling reconstruction even for the
abnormal test samples.
The qualitative results of Figure 7, supporting by the quan-
titative results of Table II reveal that abnormality detection
is successfully made in latent object space of the model that
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Anomaly Scores
Normal Scores
Abnormal Scores
Fig. 5: (a) Histogram of the normal and abnormal scores for the test
data.
Normal
Abnormal
Fig. 6: (b) t-SNE plot of the 1000 subsampled normal and abnormal
features extracted from the last convolutional layer (f(.)) of the
discriminator (Figure 3).
emerges from our adversarial training over the proposed skip-
connected architecture.
Figures 5 and 6 show the histogram plot (a) of the normal
and abnormal scores for the test data, and the t-SNE plot
(b) of the normal and abnormal features extracted from the
last convolutional layer (f(.)) of the discriminator (see Figure
3). Closer inspection of the figures reveals that the model
yields promising separation within both the output anomaly
(reconstruction) score and the preceding convolutional feature
spaces.
Overall, these results indicate that the proposed approach
yields superior anomaly detection performance to the previous
state-of-the-art approaches.
FFOB
FFOBCIFAR-10 UBA
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Fig. 7: Exemplar test images for CIFAR-10, UBA and FFOB datasets when the abnormalities are car, gun-gun component-knife and gun,
respectively. Despite the model’s capability of generating even abnormal samples, the proposed model is able to detect abnormality within
latent object space.
bird car cat deer dog frog horse plane ship truck
CIFAR-10
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
A
U
C
z: 32
z: 100
z: 256
z: 512
z: 1024
Fig. 8: Hyper-parameter tuning for the model. The model achieves
the most optimum performance when nz = 100.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion architecture within an adversarial training scheme. The
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Fig. 9: Hyper-parameter tuning for the model. The model achieves
the most optimum performance when λadv = 1, λrec=40 = 1 and
λenc = 1.
proposed approach examines the role of skip connections
within the generator and feature extraction from the discrim-
inator for the manipulation of hidden features. Based on an
evaluation across multiple datasets from different domains
and complexity, the findings indicate that skip connections
provide more stable training, and the inference learning from
the discriminator achieves numerically superior results than
the previous state-of-the-art methods. The empirical findings in
this study provide an insight into the generalization capability
of the proposed method to any anomaly detection task. Further
research could also be conducted to determine the effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach on both higher resolution
images and various other anomaly detection tasks containing
temporal information.
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